A deputy commander for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) has boasted that Iran is capable of a military confrontation with its archenemy, the United States.

Speaking with Iran’s state television on February 2, Hossein Salami also said it was during the war with Iraq in the 1980s that Iran discovered it had no political allies.

During the interview, Salami spoke of the IRGC’s “progress,” its military capabilities, and its familiarity with what he called “America’s military weaknesses in the region.” He also called Iraq and Syria “Iran’s strategic depth.”

It appears Salami made these claims on the occasion of the anniversary of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, in reaction to a new shift in U.S. military strategy in the Middle East that attaches priority to confronting “Iran’s imminent threat against the stability of the region.”

Salami has made such claims before. In May 2015, he said, “The Islamic Republic is prepared for victory over the U.S. in long and widespread confrontations.”

His statements indicate that, like many other IRGC commanders, his exaggeration of Iran’s military capabilities is based on misinformation, incorrect political analysis, and a layman’s understanding of U.S. military might and technology. This wrong self-confidence among IRGC commanders could have catastrophic consequences.

Salami’s evaluation of Iran’s “various defensive packages,” as he explained in October 2014, is based on employing cruise and ballistic missiles and drones, “precision intelligent missiles,” as well as mines, speedboats, and missile launchers in the Persian Gulf area.

In his recent interview, Salami talked about “reverse engineering of RQ170 drones and high-flying, radar-evading drones” being part of the IRGC’s capabilities.

Iran has manufactured low-profile drones such as Shahed 129, but its access to radar-evasion technology similar to that of RQ170 is debatable and unreliable.

There is no evidence to support Iran’s access to Stealth technology currently available only to the United States, Russia, and China.

Salami also said in his February 2 interview that the United States fears starting an “endless war” with the first bullet or missile fired at Iran, “and that is why America has not resorted to a military option against Iran.”

“We can bring all of the enemy bases in the region under heavy strikes. We can confront the enemy in the sea at any level,” he added.

IRGC Navy Commander Ali Fadavi also made similar claims in September 2012.

The simplistic statements by IRGC commanders ignore the fact that there are some 35,000 U.S. military personnel and seven major U.S. military bases, including the fifth fleet base in Bahrain.

There are also U.S. bases in Afghanistan and Djibouti as well as a UK naval base in Bahrain and French bases in the UAE and Abu Dhabi.

The Unite States also has an aircraft carrier in the region to thwart possible threats.

Nevertheless, Salami said in a February 5 speech that “the enemy would most certainly be defeated in a confrontation with us.”

During the same speech, he talked about an Iranian ballistic missile that “can hit moving vessels with 100 percent precision,” adding, “The technology used in this missile is matchless in America and Russia.”

This is most likely the same as the Persian Gulf Ballistic Missile or copied from Fateh -110 with a range of 300 kilometers. Experts have doubted its performance although other IRGC commanders have boasted of its features.

Following the terrorist attack on the Iranian Parliament in June 2017, Iran fired six ballistic missiles to pound an Islamic State base 650 kilometers west of Iran in Deir ez-Zor in Syria. According to Israeli experts, two of the missiles landed in Iraq and the other four never reached their target.

Other elements of Salami’s “defensive power package” seem to be less than real. Iran is incapable of minesweeping the Persian Gulf; its two or three RH-53 helicopters capable of tackling mines from the air are more than 40 years old.

Meanwhile, the idea of strategic depth in Syria and Iraq is overtly against Iran’s national interests. Iran’s presence in Syria is extremely costly and elicits Israel’s sensitivity. And Iraq cannot be part of Iran’s strategic depth. This is another illusion considering that there are some 9,000 U.S. troops in that country, and the Iraqi government is adamant to reduce Iran’s influence in order to strike a balance between ties with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

Salami, Fadavi, and other IRGC commanders believe their experience of the war with Iraq in the 1980s is their point of strength, and they try to link it to present-day regional developments. In other words, they are living in the past.

Most of those present in that war are retired now, and most of the current population is younger than 25. The region has changed. There are new players and new alliances.

Nevertheless, some former IRGC commanders such as Mohsen Rezai are still in denial and think their experience of a 1980s war can help them run the country for another 200 years.

A victory by the IRGC or the Iranian armed forces over the United States or even GCC countries looks impossible. Regardless of its missile power and relative naval supremacy, Iran is obviously vulnerable in front of Saudi Arabia’s air force. Iran’s fighters and bombers are outdated, although Iran’s air force had more aircraft than all of the Persian Gulf states in 1971.

As Salami has attested, Iran is isolated, while the Persian Gulf states enjoy the backing of the United States and each other.

Iranian military commanders’ delusion of power and their bloated rhetoric are mainly based on miscalculations, simplistic thinking, and false self-confidence. This could spell catastrophe for Iran and its people.