In its efforts to prevent the spread of coronavirus, the religious dictatorship in Tehran has been consistently negligent. Yet the regime has been remarkably eager to claim that it deserves immediate relief from sanctions so that it can fight the virus more effectively. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo underscored this contradiction in late March by releasing footage of President Hassan Rouhani telling senior officials in surgical masks that Tehran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had launched a “concerted effort to influence public opinion to say ‘no’ to sanctions” for the purpose of “bringing back our money seized in other countries.” As the State Department noted, the regime only wants cash – it has turned down offers of medical assistance not just from the United States, but from charities like Doctors Without Borders.

This episode points to the indispensable role that propaganda plays in the Islamic Republic’s strategy for defeating the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign. In the four decades since its inception, the regime has invested heavily in building a propaganda machine at home and abroad. Western countries, in particular the U.S., are the target of messages broadcast by multiple government agencies and regime-controlled “non-governmental” institutions. U.S. policymakers and analysts should pay close attention to the regime’s attempts to shape European and American public opinion.

The institutions that conduct Tehran’s influence operations each focuses on a specific task, but there are overlaps between what they do. Chief among these organizations are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the information arms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and a group of religious organizations including the Islamic Development Organization, Al-Mustafa International University, and the Islamic Propaganda Office of Qom Seminary.

* At official exchange rate of $1 = 37690 rial

** At official exchange rate of $1 = 42000 rial

*** We assumed 15 percent of the 150 million euro from NDF will be allocated to the foreign broadcasting program as the NDF fund has not been allocated to a specific program or budget item of the IRIB.

MFA and its Public Diplomacy Division are a pillar of Tehran’s efforts to influence U.S. public opinion. Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif has built a reputation, however misleading, as a reasonable diplomat whose opinions deserve more serious consideration than the ideological outbursts of the regime’s religious zealots. Educated in the U.S., Zarif has spent decades establishing personal connections with U.S. journalists, policymakers, and business executives in order to influence American public opinion and Washington’s policies.

The Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), headed by ministry spokesman Seyyed Abbas Mousavi, plays an important role in disinformation campaigns together with the Iranian Expatriates Division, led by Hossein Jaberi Ansari. They seek to influence millions of Iranian expatriates, the majority of whom reside in Western Europe and North America. Regime officials regularly meet with Iranian expats around the world, in large and small groups. Some of these expats have founded organizations to promote sanctions relief and a more conciliatory approach to Iran. These shared objectives are not grounds for concluding that such organizations coordinate their actions with Tehran, yet the regime clearly places a high value on their efforts. The 2020-2021 budget allocates $105 million dollars for influence operations targeting the diaspora, nearly tripling the previous year’s funding. This remarkable increase amid severe financial pressures on the regime indicates the value of such efforts.

With its monopoly over radio and television broadcasts, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) plays a critical role both at home and abroad. To shape political discourse abroad, IRIB operates television channels in English (PressTV), Spanish (HispanTV), and other key languages. Political leaders such as Jeremy Corbyn of the British Labor Party, and Pablo Iglesias of Spain’s Podemos, have appeared on and/or consulted for IRIB stations. IRIB’s importance to the regime is clear from its budget; despite dire economic conditions, the agency will receive almost $1 billion this year, a significant increase over $488 million a year earlier. The budget also allows the transfer of available additional 150 million euro, almost $165 million, from Iran’s National Development Fund to IRIB. Furthermore, the budget does not include the substantial advertising revenue IRIB generates thanks to its broadcasting monopoly, an amount likely in the hundreds of millions. From its official budget, IRIB allocates almost 16 percent to foreign broadcasting.

The three religious organizations with a central role in projecting influence abroad – the Islamic Development Organization, Al-Mustafa International University, and Islamic Propaganda Office of Qom Seminary – chiefly focus on training Shiite clerics, sending missionaries across the globe, and disseminating Shiite propaganda. Their goal is to create a network of native missionaries in each country who are loyal to Tehran, an effort that has been especially successful in Latin America. In the United States itself, there are clerics sympathetic to Iran who frequently travel to the country. As with expatriate organizations, there is insufficient evidence in the public domain to conclude that these clerics coordinate with Tehran.

Al-Mustafa has trained 50,000 students from 122 nations so far. One teacher and advisor at Al-Mustafa is Mohsen Rabani, who served for decades as Iran’s top intelligence officer in Latin America and is wanted for his role in the 1994 AMIA terror attack in Buenos Aires, which claimed 85 lives. Rabani’s top disciple and graduate of Al-Mustafa, Edgardo Ruben Suhail Assad, has established more than 20 Shiite religious centers in Latin America. Al-Mustafa and the Islamic Development Organization closely coordinate their efforts in sending missionaries abroad.

At the official dollar rate, Al-Mustafa University will receive $80 million in 2020-2021; the Islamic Development Organization will receive $153 million, while the Islamic Propaganda Office of Qom Seminary will receive $36 million – a total of $268 million, down slightly from $292 million the previous fiscal year. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei personally appointed Ali Abbasi as the director of Al-Mustafa, and Mohammad Qomi as director of the Islamic Development Organization. Khamenei also appoints the board of directors of the Islamic Propaganda Office, which, in turn, appoints its director, currently Ahmad Vaezi. The U.S. Treasury can impose sanctions on all three of them under the terms of a June 2019 Executive Order that directs the designation of all individuals appointed directly by the supreme leader.

Two other organizations that play a role in exerting influence abroad are the IRGC-controlled Fars News and Tasnim News, both of which magnify the voice of anti-American figures through their English language operations. Fars and Tasnim consistently publish interviews with western pundits and analysts who echo Tehran’s propaganda. Also, IRGC-connected media personalities such as Nader Talebzadeh travel around the world and invite guests to conferences in Iran to expand Tehran’s network of influence and fellow travelers. Treasury designated Talebzadeh for facilitating the recruitment assets for the IRGC Quds Force, an indication of the degree to which Iranian media are part of the security establishment.

The readiness of a cash-strapped regime is to spend so much on external propaganda demonstrates just how important these organizations are to Tehran. Washington should actively expose their disinformation campaigns and employ the relevant executive orders to impose sanctions on the entities and individuals that carry out such work. Designating the heads of organizations listed above would be a first step. Tens of millions of Iranians would welcome a measure of accountability for the propaganda outlets complicit in their oppression.

The Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), headed by ministry spokesman Seyyed Abbas Mousavi, plays an important role in disinformation campaigns together with the Iranian Expatriates Division, led by Hossein Jaberi Ansari. They seek to influence millions of Iranian expatriates, the majority of whom reside in Western Europe and North America. Regime officials regularly meet with Iranian expats around the world, in large and small groups. Some of these expats have founded organizations to promote sanctions relief and a more conciliatory approach to Iran. These shared objectives are not grounds for concluding that such organizations coordinate their actions with Tehran, yet the regime clearly places a high value on their efforts. The 2020-2021 budget allocates $105 million dollars for influence operations targeting the diaspora, nearly tripling the previous year’s funding. This remarkable increase amid severe financial pressures on the regime indicates the value of such efforts.

With its monopoly over radio and television broadcasts, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) plays a critical role both at home and abroad. To shape political discourse abroad, IRIB operates television channels in English (PressTV), Spanish (HispanTV), and other key languages. Political leaders such as Jeremy Corbyn of the British Labor Party, and Pablo Iglesias of Spain’s Podemos, have appeared on and/or consulted for IRIB stations. IRIB’s importance to the regime is clear from its budget; despite dire economic conditions, the agency will receive almost $1 billion this year, a significant increase over $488 million a year earlier. The budget also allows the transfer of available additional 150 million euro, almost $165 million, from Iran’s National Development Fund to IRIB. ​

Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior Iran and financial economics advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Alireza Nader is a senior fellow. They both contribute to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). Follow Alireza and Saeed on Twitter @AlirezaNader and @SGhasseminejad.

Opinions expressed by the authors are not necessarily the views of Radio Farda